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Chapter 7
Designing Total Reward Programs
for Tight Labor Markets
Eric P. Lofgren, Steven A. Nyce,
and Sylvester J. Schieber
Over the last several years, U.S. employers have had to scramble for
workers of all sorts in unprecedented ways. After experiencing personnel
shortfalls during the late 1990s, the Navy has pursued new recruiting
approaches: in 2001, for instance, it sent almost every Harvard undergrad-
uate an e-mail invitation to apply to become a commissioned ofWcer in the
U.S. Navy (Gizzle 2001). The furniture store, Ikea, also has sought new
ways to attract job applicants, by posting want ads on the walls of restrooms
(Seattle Post-Intelligencer 2000). A recent article in HR Magazine (Tyler 2001)
told of recruiting of a mechanical engineer from Detroit to San Francisco.
With two job offers in hand, he took the one that included an “employer-
assisted housing” program. Manufacturing jobs continue to decline in the
U.S. economy, but there are still many employers that need workers. 
Some people believe that the recent economic slowdown, starting in 2000,
may dampen employers’ efforts to Wnd creative new ways of recruiting staff.
The reality is, that despite news of layoffs, unemployment rates in the United
States remain low by historical standards. Even with the collapse of many
dot.com Wrms, there are still technology jobs going unWlled. For example
People3 Inc., a Gartner company that analyzes trends in information tech-
nology, predicts that demand for IT workers will outpace supply by at least 20
percent over the next four years. Dot.com workers thrown out of jobs at high-
technology Wrms are often able to Wnd technology jobs in more traditional
Wrms, as the latter adopt their own e-business innovations (Goodridge 2001).
The U.S. economy has clearly been the most vibrant of all the major
countries over the last decade. Now the question is whether that vibrancy
can be maintained in the face of changing labor markets. In this chapter
we suggest that tight labor markets of the last decade have generated a
variety of unique approaches to Wnding, attracting, and retaining workers.
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Furthermore, we argue these will persist over most of the coming decade,
and we conclude that employers of the future may even confront greater
challenges in stafWng than they have in the past.
Economic Output and the
Supply of and Demand for Labor
Economists have developed macroeconomic models to investigate the link-
ages between economic production levels and the supply of workers who
generate it. In such models, three key factors contribute to production:
human capital, physical capital, and technology. Workers and their inherent
work-related capabilities comprise the human capital that can be used in
the productive processes of an economy. Physical capital refers to the plants
and equipment, as well as hardware and software, available for workers to
use in the production of goods and services. Technology comprises the
level of knowledge and know-how that is embedded in production processes.
One premise of such models is that more physical capital makes workers
more productive, up to a point. For example, one worker with one air gun
might drive as many nails in a day as three workers with regular hammers.
In this simple example, one carpenter with an air gun can substitute for
three carpenters with regular hammers. But substitution of capital for labor
cannot go on forever: workers simply cannot fully utilize more tools with-
out limit. 
Economic models also posit that technology evolves over time and can
enhance productivity of physical capital, human capital, or both. It can also
change the way in which capital and labor can be substituted for each other.
There are two important aspects to technology improvement in the U.S.
economy. First, it evolves because of research and development activities, but
once discovered, new inventions can generally be widely adapted (unless the
creators limit distribution to other enterprises through patent or other law).
In general though, discovery does not automatically translate into enhanced
worker productivity; instead it must be adapted to become effective. Sec-
ond, technology is adapted at uneven rates across economic sectors, so its
overall effect on productivity is also uneven across sectors and over time. 
The Wnal central premise of economic production models is that human
capital can be expanded along two dimensions if necessary. First, the num-
ber of workers can be increased or the hours worked by employees can
be increased. Such an increase in labor supply is generally anticipated to
lead to increased production. Second, any given pool of workers can also
acquire new skills that make them more productive. Over time in the United
States, the supply of human capital has grown and worker characteristics
have changed in ways that have enhanced average productivity levels.
One way to measure the amount of human capital employed focuses
on the number of workers employed. This is a crude measure since it does
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not account for the variability in work hours, nor does it take account of
employees’ different characteristics. Nevertheless, it does provide a rough
estimate of how worker productivity has changed in recent decades. Figure
1 illustrates the growth in the U.S. workforce since 1946, along with the
increase in the inXation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) that these
workers produced. Annual observations are given relative to the baselines
for labor supply and output in 1946, so the results can be thought of as
an indexed level of activity against those bases. 
The data show that that U.S. civilian employment levels rose by 2.4 times
between 1946 and 2000, and real gross domestic product rose 6.2 times. In
other words, workers now produce about two-and-a-half times as much out-
put as their forebears did in 1946. Part of this productivity increase is attrib-
utable to enhanced skills of modern workers as compared to those in 1946.
But a substantial additional portion is due to these workers having more
capital to work with, and to new technology making them more productive.
The result of this growth in productivity over time is that the average U.S.
standard of living today is far higher than in 1946. InXation-adjusted GDP
per capita rose about 3.2 times over the period,1 with an annualized growth
rate in per capita GDP over the last half of the twentieth century of an
annualized decadal growth of between 1.73 and 2.87 percent.2
Whether this pattern of steadily rising output per capita will persist into
the future is a key question. To some extent, it is a “chicken and egg” issue,
since rising demand for goods and services is what pulls an economy
Total Reward Programs for Tight Labor Markets 153
Figure 1. Civilian employment and real gross domestic production in the United
States for selected years relative to 1946 baseline levels. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce (2000, 2001), Council of Economic Advisors (2001).
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forward. During periods of high demand, economic growth tends to be
high as producers organize their activities to meet consumers’ appetites.
Low unemployment, overtime, and other vestiges of a high-performance
economy generally characterize such periods, and they combine to make
workers earn relatively high pay that further stimulates the demand for
goods and services. During booms, worker productivity increases, whereas
labor productivity improvements slow or even fall during economic slow-
downs. In recessions, surplus capacity develops as employers cut production;
initially they may be reluctant to lay off surplus labor due to substantial
investments in their know-how and experience. Since it may be cheaper to
carry surplus labor than to have to Wnd, hire, and train new workers when
economic growth resumes, labor productivity improvements tend to slow or
stall during such periods.
Many groups seek to forecast future economic activity; Table 1 reports
projections of GDP growth developed by the Congressional Budget OfWce
(CBO), the Clinton administration, and an average of approximately Wfty
private-sector forecasts known as the “Blue Chip” series. The evidence indi-
cates that there is a relatively narrow band around forecasters’ economic
growth projections over the coming decade. These economic projections
are consistent with the historical experience of ever-improving U.S. stan-
dards of living (measured by increasing income). Using the CBO projec-
tions for real GDP growth from 2001 through 2010, we estimate that GDP
in 2010 (in $1996) will be about $12.5 trillion, or over one-third larger than
in 2000. Using Census Bureau projection of the population for 2010, we
estimate that per capita output in 2010 will be approximately $41,850 (in
$1996). This implies an annual GDP per capita growth rate of 2.14 percent
over this decade, a rate of improvement consistent with historical patterns.3
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Table 1. Change in Projections of Average Annual Growth of Real GDP,
1997–2001
Date projection Projection Clinton 
publisheda period CBO Blue chip administration
2001 2001–2010 3.0 3.3 3.1
2000b 2000–2009 2.8 2.7 2.8
1999b 1999–2008 2.3 2.4 2.3
1998 1998–2007 2.2 2.3 2.3
1997 1997–2006 2.1 2.3 2.3
Source: CBO (2001).
a Congressional Budget OfWce (CBO) and Clinton administration projections were
published in January and completed in November or December of the previous year. Blue
Chip, an average of over Wfty private-sector forecasts, publishes long-term projections twice a
year, in March and October; the projections shown here are those published in October
of the previous year.
b About 0.3 percentage points of the change between these projections stemmed from a
benchmark revision to gross domestic product during 1999 that, for the Wrst time, included
software in GDP.
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There are only two ways that an economy can increase the supply of
goods and services available to its population at rates in excess of popula-
tion growth: to import more, or to produce more. Unless the U.S. economy
is permitted to substantially increase its trade deWcit (other nations must
be are willing to provide the capital to do so), our ability to improve the
standards of living in the United States are to a substantial degree capped
by what can be produced here. The U.S. trade balance has been negative
for many years, though last year the net import balance remained less than
3 percent of GDP. 
Hence our next question is what employers may face in the labor market,
as they are called on to deliver the growth in output required for consis-
tency with these macroeconomic projections. Various scenarios are consid-
ered, including one that assumes the United States will realize productivity
grown implicit in the CBO projection; another assumes productivity growth
more in line with historical rates. As we show, if productivity growth slows
to rates characteristic of the twenty-Wve years ending in 1995, then the
United States will simply end up with less output. However, there will be
some demand pressure in the output markets to increase production at
higher rates. This is consistent with the view that society will want to con-
tinue improving its living standard at rates consistent with past expecta-
tions. In the past, when the economy has slowed for any substantial period
of time, the public has responded by bringing pressure on policymakers
to restore economic growth. Should there be demand pressure to increase
output in the face of slowing worker productivity growth, employers could
respond in a variety of ways, so as to attract more employees. Next we
explore the extent to which additional workers might have to be attracted
into the labor market, and the ways in which employers might do so.
Labor Market Prospects in the Coming Decade
At the end of the twentieth century, U.S. labor markets were very tight. Even
as the economy slowed considerably over 2000 from its torrid pace of the
late 1990s, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate remained well below
its historic trend. In fact, unemployment rates in the early 2000s remained
roughly a full percentage point below the CBO’s estimate of the nonaccel-
erating inXation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).4 Figure 2 depicts growth
in the U.S. civilian labor force along with Social Security actuarial pro-
jections over the next two decades. During the 1990s, these were lower than
they had been over the prior three decades, which helps to explain why
recruitment and retention was such a challenge. 
As we look to the future, however, anticipated growth rates are expected
to be signiWcantly lower than those experienced over the past decade. The
Social Security actuaries estimate that labor force growth over the coming
decade will be only about three quarters of the 1990s level, and the growth
Total Reward Programs for Tight Labor Markets 155
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rate projected for 2010 will only be one-third that of the past decade. Unless
there is a signiWcant and prolonged softening of the economy, the United
States may be in for a considerable period of tighter labor markets.
How many employees may be required will ultimately depend on two
factors: (1) the level of aggregate output and (2) the efWciency with which
workers are employed in producing that output. The Wrst will be driven by
the level of demand for goods and services in the economy (as well as gov-
ernment spending and imports). The second can be understood in terms
of GDP produced per unit of labor input, for which good historical data
is not widely available. The best source consists of series on total hours
worked per year from 1950, from which average total product per hour of
labor can be derived. Average GDP per labor hour grew at a rate of 2.66
percent per year during the 1950s and 1960s, slowed to 1.57 percent per
year kin the 1970s, fell further to 1.43 percent per year during the 1980s,
and recovered slightly to 1.69 percent per year in the 1990s (with a spurt to
2.27 percent per year during the last half of the 1990s). To project future
productivity experts begin by estimating the demand for goods and services
based on the size and composition of sectors of the economy.5 Here we rely
on ten-year macroeconomic projections developed by the CBO for federal
budget and policy purposes; these estimates indicate that GDP will grow (in
inXation-adjusted terms) by 2.4 percent in 2001, 3.4 percent in 2002, 3.3
percent in 2003 and 3.0 percent annually from 2003 to 2009, with 2010
coming in slightly higher at 3.1 percent. Using these assumptions and base-
line 2000 GDP, we generate an estimate of GDP in 2010 (in $1996) of $12.5
trillion estimate.
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Figure 2. U.S. civilian labor force growth rates for selected decades. Source: derived
from Council of Advisors (2001), Social Security Administration (2001a).
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To understand the challenge that employers face in generating the out-
put levels required by these forecasts over the coming decade, it is helpful
to investigate the link between the economy’s potential labor supply and
the likely demand for labor under alternative growth scenarios. First we
project “baseline” labor supply to 2010 using current workforce patterns
and expected population changes in the coming decade; labor supply pat-
terns by age are assumed to persist into the future. For example, 45 percent
of the population between the ages of 60 and 64 is in the labor force today,
so the model assumes in the future, the same 45 percent of this age bracket
will be in the labor force. In addition, workers by age are assumed to work
the same number of hours per year as in recent times.6
Labor demand estimates use the CBO’s GDP projections discussed above
with a range of productivity improvement scenarios. The Wrst projections
factor in realized productivity increases already been reported for 2000.
Hence the most conservative scenario posits that output per worker-hour
grows at a rate of 1.5 percent per year, the average growth in output per
hour over the past three decades. A second (third) scenario assumes that
output per hour increases at a rate of 1.75 (2.0) percent per year; this bands
worker productivity increases in the past decade. A Wnal scenario boosts
growth in output per hour to 2.23 percent per year, a rate exceeded in the
1950s and 1960s but matched since then only in the last Wve years.7
Our resultant labor supply and demand projections appear in Figure 3,
depicted in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE) workers, which is obtained
by dividing the total number of projected hours by a full-time employment
level of 2000 hours per year. The most conservative scenario indicates that
labor shortfalls might be substantial, on the order of 7.5 percent or 10.2
million FTEs short of the labor supplied in 2010. The other scenarios indi-
cate a labor gap of between 3.1 and 6.6 million FTEs. Unless the United
States sustains a high rate of growth in output per hour — something like
2.23 percent — over the coming decade, it will have a signiWcant labor
shortfall. 
One alternative to the shortfall scenario might require that there will be
a slowdown in the growth of standards of living. Another is that high levels
of productivity improvement must be sustained in the coming decade. It is
possible that labor supply could be boosted by enticing more people into
the labor force, or by enticing current workers to consistently work longer
hours than they do today. As long as productivity growth remains below
2.23 percent per year, there are three sources of additional labor supply
that could be tapped to alleviate potential shortages including (1) participa-
tion increases across the board, (2) participation changes among women,
and (3) participation changes among older persons (e.g., 55- to 64-year-old
workers exhibit participation patterns like those 45–54 years old).8
Table 2 indicates what would have to hold to eliminate the projected
labor supply shortages. The results are rather striking. In the scenario
Total Reward Programs for Tight Labor Markets 157
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where participation rises across the board, and given only 1.5 percent pro-
ductivity growth, labor force participation or hours worked would need to
increase roughly 7.5 percent from the projected labor supply levels to meet
labor force demand in 2010. At the higher productivity scenarios, required
participation changes are 4.9 percent for a growth rate of 1.75 percent and
2.3 percent for a 2.0 percent growth assumption.
Few ways are available to achieve such increases in labor supply. If the
responses occurred across the board, and given a 1.5 percent productivity
improvement scenario, men ages 25–39 would have to boost participation
from 91.5 percent in 2000, to 98.3 percent by 2010; the rise among men
ages 40–54 would be from 89.2 to 95.8 percent. These increases, along with
the commensurate rates for women, seem almost impossible to achieve.
Current workers could alternatively work more hours per week than they
do now; men in their prime working ages would average nearly 42 hours
weekly for 52 weeks per year, and virtually all women would have to move to
full-time employment. More rapid improvements in worker productivity
would alleviate there requirements, though even at a 2.0 percent productiv-
ity growth rate, all men between the age of 25 and 54 would have to average
40 hours per week for 52 weeks per year.
One issue is whether extracting additional work from groups that already
spend an average of 40 hours per week on the job will precipitate signiW-
cant wage pressures. An alternate strategy might be for employers to entice
people into the labor force who now have relatively low participation rates.
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Figure 3. Projected U.S. labor supply versus demand under alternative productivity
growth scenarios for 2000–2010. Source: derived from Social Security Administra-
tion (2001b), U.S. Department of Commerce (2002), Unicon (2000), U.S. Bureau
of the Census  (2000), Council of Economic Advisors (2001).
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Women’s labor force participation has been rising over time but it is still 15
percentage points below men’s. In one set of scenarios, we estimated how
much higher women’s participation rates would have to grow to achieve
output growth similar to experiences since World War II. The results from
the 1.5 percent productivity scenario appear in Figure 4. By 2010, women’s
required participation rates would have to rise to the equivalent of men’s
rates in 2000, under this scenario. It seems unlikely that than many addi-
tional women could be enticed into paid work (Nyce and Schieber 2001;
Smith and Bachu 1999). 
Enticing older people to participate at greater rates might help, though
the results indicate that if men ages 55–64 maintained workforce attach-
ment similar to that of present-day men ages 45–54, they would need to
increase their labor force by 25 percent over the coming decade (see Fig-
ure 5). And participation of men ages 55–64 would need to increase to 85
percent by 2010. If workers 65 years and over were tapped to make up the
shortfall, their labor force participation rates would need to increase nearly
140 percent over current levels, to roughly 39 percent for men and slightly
over 20 percent for women. These projections seem incredibly high, as
compared to recent trends.
Meeting the Productivity Challenge 
The baby boomer generation has inXuenced the U.S. economic in number
of ways. Its sheer size depressed earnings, at least during the early portion
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Figure 4. Labor force participation rates of men and women at various ages in 2000
with required increases in women’s participation to meet labor force demands,
assuming 1.5 percent productivity growth. Source: derived from Social Security
Administration (2001b), U.S. Department of Commerce (2002), Unicon (2000),
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000), Council of Economic Advisors (2001).
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of the boomers’ careers, which likely increased women’s labor force partic-
ipation rates (Macunovich 2001). Baby boomer working women were more
educated than their predecessors and many of them pursued more diversi-
Wed careers than prior generations of women. Career opportunities became
important issues as they progressed through their careers, and the record
number of new workers between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s pushed
older workers out of the way and into retirement. Though many employers
sponsored retirement plans, early retirement incentives began encouraging
workers to retire as early as their mid-50s largely in response to the low-
cost labor. 
Now, the front edge of the baby boom generation is beginning to cross
the early retirement threshold that it helped create. In the labor market, the
phenomenon of baby boomers rushing for retirement may have the opposite
effect of the one created as boomers entered the workforce. Waves of retire-
ment may produce a “worker void” leaving Wrms scrambling to Wnd enough
people to meet production needs. These facts, combined with low fertility
rates, suggests that labor force growth rates over the coming decade will only
be about three-fourths of those already low growth rates seen in the 1990s;
growth rates in the 2010s will likely be half those of the current decade. 
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Figure 5. Labor force participation rates of men and women at various ages in 2000
with required increases in older workers’ participation to meet labor force
demands. Calculations assume 1.5 percent productivity growth; labor force partici-
pation rates for men and women aged 55–64 increase along current trends by 25
percent and 40 percent respectively; rates for men and women aged 65+ increase at
138 percent of their current levels. Source: derived from Social Security Adminis-
tration (2001b), U.S. Department of Commerce (2002), Unicon (2000), U.S. Bureau
of the Census (2000), Council of Economic Advisors (2001).
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As a result of these trends, some human resource managers are already
emphasizing “attracting and retaining” employees, in the process restruc-
turing aspects of their human resources operations to pull in new streams
of workers. Others are scrambling to restructure pay and beneWt programs
to ensure stability in their existing workforces. Nevertheless, employers
are limited in their ability to deal with the existing phenomenon of tight
labor markets, much less the increasingly daunting situation we will face
going forward.
Only four practical possibilities are available: diminish turnover, attract
new types of workers, retain existing workers longer, or extract higher lev-
els of productivity from existing workers. Every one of these options poses
a challenge, and no single one may be a solution to the labor market prob-
lems faced in the U.S. environment.
Reducing Turnover
Turnover raises the cost of recruiting and hiring workers, and disrupts the
workplace. It also imposes training costs and the time required to advanc-
ing a new hire to the productivity level of an experienced worker. And in
many cases, workers develop ongoing relationships with customers that are
a signiWcant reason for repurchase decisions. In developing Watson Wyatt’s
Human Capital IndexTM, we recently surveyed 405 publicly traded U.S. Wrms
asking about annual personnel turnover rates. We then classiWed these rel-
ative to average industry turnover rates in that industry, and related these
to shareholder surplus value and shareholder returns. The analysis shows
that low-turnover Wrms had average Tobin’s Q of 2.55 while the high turn-
over Wrms had a score of only 1.67; Tobin’s Q captures the value of a Wrm’s
intangible assets and is measured by the ratio of the Wrm’ market value to
its asset replacement costs. In addition, the three-year total shareholder
return in low-turnover Wrms was 79 percent, while in high turnover Wrms
it was 33 percent. The Wve-year total return to shareholders was 133 per-
cent and 57 percent, for low and high turnover Wrms, respectively (Luss and
Kay 1999). 
This does not imply that optimal turnover rates should be zero, of course.
In Europe, for example, some companies may promote excessive job
security, leading to complacency or under-motivated workers. Indeed our
research indicates that too much job security is associated with reduced sur-
plus value levels; these employers having the lowest turnover rates relied
more on tenure-based beneWts and recognition programs, and more rigid
career paths. These companies were also more likely to tolerate poor per-
formance and lacked performance-based reward programs (Watson Wyatt
Worldwide 2000).
If too much turnover and too little turnover curtail value creation, it sug-
gests an underlying model of productivity along the lines depicted in Figure
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6. The optimal level of turnover will likely vary from industry to industry
and even from Wrm to Wrm. In the United States, substantial differences can
be detected between low and high turnover Wrms with regard to their
human capital management practices. Compared to high-turnover Wrms,
those with low turnover tend to have a reputation among new applicants as
a more desirable place to work, and they have an easier time Wnding quali-
Wed applicants. Low-turnover Wrms also Wll a higher percentage of their
professional positions through internal promotions, and have a more col-
legial and Xexible work environment. For example, they are less likely to
require titles to designate authority, they permit rank and Wle employees to
use senior mangers’ Wrst names, and they encourage teamwork and coop-
eration. They also emphasize employment security; share business plans
and goals with employees; give employees greater input into hiring deci-
sions and how work is done; and report higher levels of employee satisfac-
tion. In selecting their leaders, these low-turnover companies place greater
emphasis on “people skills.”
While individual employers can curtail individual worker mobility, reduc-
ing job hopping of this sort is a zero sum game from the economy’s per-
spective. Very tight labor markets can lead to “poaching” and other tactics
that would have been considered abnormal in the past. Some Wrms have
already resorted to guerrilla tactics to Wnd workers in market areas with low
unemployment rates. For instance, a network hardware Wrm in Durham,
North Carolina, posted signs along the commuting routes of engineers work-
ing at Nortel and Cisco (Cannon 2000). A high-technology Wrm in Texas sent
recruiters on in-line skates to distribute job-opening leaXets to competitors’
employees as they were arriving at work (police were called to dispatch the
rolling recruiters; Koenig 2000). All is not good-humored fun; Alcatel
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Figure 6. A model of the relationship between turnover and productivity. Source:
developed by the authors.
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recently sued Cisco Systems claiming that the other Wrm had hired away a
group of Alcatel engineers in order to learn trade secrets (Koenig 2000). 
Competition among employers to retain their most talented employees
and the phenomenal growth in the U.S. stock market in the last two decades
of the twentieth century produced a surge in stock-based incentive compen-
sation, especially stock options. The average “overhang” level for a Wrm in
the S&P 1500, deWned as stock options granted plus those remaining to be
granted as a percentage of the total shares outstanding, grew from 5.4 per-
cent to 13 percent (Luss and Kay 2000). On the other hand, the downturn
in the stock market of late has left many Wrms scrambling to keep employee
stock options aXoat. Although economic theory would contend otherwise,
many employers have been forced to reprice their underwater options to
prevent employees from walking down the street to achieve essentially iden-
tical compensation packages. It seems clear that as labor markets tighten,
there will be a proliferation of noncompete arrangements, employment con-
tracts, and even lawsuits aimed at inhibiting the free Xow of workers across
companies. However, as some employers Wgure out how to reduce turnover
within their own workforces, this simply adds to other Wrm’s shortages.
Bidding New Workers into the Workforce
One alternative to ease the pressures of tighter labor markets is to expand
the supply of labor. Women’s participation rates are about 15 percentage
points below those of their male counterparts, so it might be possible to
attract this last residual pool of women, many of whom are physically able
to work outside the home. But to do so the job offer will have to become
more attractive. Offering more Xexibility regarding work-life patterns may
help, to the extent that employers can provide workers with the change to
manage their individual circumstances. For working mothers, it may be
important to leave work in time to meet the school bus; women who care for
elderly parents may need to leave work in an emergency or for an extended
period of time.
A recent survey of large employers and employees designated as “top-
performers” asked how effective certain practices were in helping attract
and retain highly productive workers. Employer responses, as well as those
of the female employees who responded to the questions, are reported in
Figure 7. Respondent women were divided into two groups: those with chil-
dren and those without. It is interesting that both groups of women have
similar answers, on the one hand, while there are signiWcant discrepancies
between employee and employer responses on three of the four measures.
Clearly alternative work arrangements are important to women, especially
Xexible work schedules and job requirements. It is possible that the Inter-
net and company intranets will allow new ways for employees and managers
to communicate, making work from home a more realistic alternative. 
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This survey also indicates that employers could reconsider their policies
toward the organization of work and the demands placed on women work-
ers. A key challenge in this regard will be to make part-time work more
efWcient. Today’s labor market indicates a remarkable discrepancy in the
productivity of part-time versus full-time workers: Lettau (1994, p. 15)
found that in Wrms that used both types of workers, “compensation in part-
time jobs is signiWcantly lower than in full-time jobs when jobs from the
same establishment and occupation are compared.” Regarding beneWts
he found that “it is often true that the full-time job receives the beneWt
while the part-time job does not.” On the other hand, “[i]t is virtually never
true that the part-time job receives the beneWt while the full-time job does
not.” (p. 16) 
Explanations for the part-time/full-time pay difference include the pos-
sibility that part-time workers might work in less productive Wrms, though
Lettau’s data suggest this theory is only partially correct, if at all, since
information is collected from the same Wrms. A second theory is that work-
ers who choose to work part time are simply not as productive as those who
choose to work full time, and sorting is reXected in compensation differen-
tials. There is little empirical grounding for this view, though Ippolito
(1997) contends that employers seek “signals” indicating which employees
are reliable, for example, in terms of job attendance. He ties reliability to
the use of sick leave among a group of federal workers, their accumulated
sick leave balances (that they can carry over indeWnitely), their use of un-
paid leave, and voluntary termination behavior. In that analysis he reported
a negative and statistically signiWcant relationship between the use of these
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Figure 7. Attitudes of top-performing female employees and their employers toward
Xexible work arrangements. Source: authors’ calculations from Watson Wyatt
Worldwide (2000).
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beneWts and earnings. Women willing to work only part time because of
family obligations may be interpreted as signaling a lesser commitment,
which in turn explains their lower compensation. A Wnal explanation for
lower pay for part-timers is that there are economies of scale or technology
that demand a minimum period of work per day, to achieve optimal pro-
ductivity. While there has been a steady decline in average hours worked in
manufacturing jobs from around sixty hours per week in the United States
in 1890 to about forty-two hours per week in 1930, average hours worked
per week have not changed much even though real earnings have risen
(McGill et al. 1996).9
Looking ahead to a period of lower labor force growth, it is possible that
employers will need to Wnd ways to entice women into the workforce, and it
may be that few of these will be willing to commit to full-time jobs particu-
larly during child-raising years. As a result, employers will either have to
enhance productivity during relatively short work periods, or facilitate their
working longer than they might be naturally inclined to do. Along with
more Xexible work arrangements, beneWts that appeal to parents could also
prove successful with women who are not currently full-time employees. For
example, childcare costs have become a very signiWcant part of two-earner
couples’ budgets. Women’s decisions to return to work after childbirth is
highly correlated with employer policies; job Xexibility and part-time work
prove to increase the probability of a mother returning to work after child-
birth, along with unpaid leave, pretax savings accounts, and child care in
the workplace (Hofferth 1996; Glass and Riley 1998). Some commentators
emphasize job guarantees, formal pay policies, and phase-back programs
for new parents are also important criteria for working mothers as they
assess their employment situation. Employers hoping to tap these potential
sources of labor supply in the future may Wnd they need to do more in pro-
viding such enabling beneWts. 
Keeping Older Workers
A different approach would be to entice older workers to extend their
careers. In the coming decade, as Riche (this volume) notes, the relative
share in the 45+ age group will rise substantially, with the largest growth
among workers ages 55–64. While today this is a common age for retire-
ment, many such workers are still highly productive. Facing a shortage of
talent, some employers will likely Wnd a better use for their most experi-
enced employees than putting them out to a premature retirement. Recent
changes in retirement policies have already begun boosting incentives for
older individuals to work longer, including the repeal of the earnings test
under Social Security for beneWciaries 65+. This could induce older work-
ers to postpone retirement and attract them back into the workforce
and/or increase their incentive to work longer hours. 
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Employers have also repositioned beneWt programs, particularly by offer-
ing hybrid pension plans as an alternative to traditional deWned beneWt
(DB) pensions. Under the traditional DB plan, the beneWt formula would
accrue beneWt values slowly during the early part of the worker’s career,
and it would rapidly accelerate near retirement. Most traditional DB plans
also had early retirement subsidies that promoted early exits. By contrast,
hybrid or cash-balance plans largely eliminate early retirement subsidies
(Clark et al. 2001). Moreover, these are more conducive to the transient
state of today’s workforce by permitting employees to take their account
balances with them on changing jobs. 
On the whole, however, employers have not yet fully committed to mech-
anisms that appeal to retaining older workers. In surveying 400 company
HR executives, only 18 percent of Wrms had implemented beneWts packages
targeted towards older employees (AARP 2000); one-third of employers
have implemented part-time work arrangements for older employees. 
On the positive side, formal “phased retirement” programs are now being
developed, where employment practices and pension accruals are altered
to retain older workers either on a part-time or part-year basis. A survey of
large employers found that 16 percent offered some form of phased retire-
ment program in 1999, up from 8 percent in 1997.10 Employers are also
hiring “un-retirees” for part-time and temporary employment, as well as con-
sultants. Furthermore some 60 percent of the employers surveyed featured
reduced workdays and/or workweeks, while nearly one-quarter of employ-
ers permitted extended leaves of absence for workers nearing retirement. 
The future of phased retirement is likely to be a permanent develop-
ment, since it is mutually beneWcial to both employers and employees. Only
one in four working Americans believes he will have enough money to live
comfortably in retirement (EBRI 1999); 68 percent of men and 65 percent
of women surveyed in 2000 thought they will work for pay in retirement, up
from 65 percent for men and 57 percent for women in 1998. Interestingly,
most people report that the main reason to extend the work life is a desire
to stay involved and having a satisfying way to spend time. Of course young
workers may report that they intend to work beyond normal retirement age,
but they may feel quite differently in their mid-60s. 
In any event, there appears to be growing interest in helping workers
move gradually from full-time work to complete retirement. But several reg-
ulatory hurdles make it difWcult to implement phased retirement arrange-
ments including restriction on in-service distributions of retirement beneWts.
Nevertheless, substantial fractions of Watson Wyatt surveys indicate a mod-
erate-to-high level of interest in implementing phased retirement arrange-
ments over the next two to three years, and nearly half report they hope to
retain skilled workers by implementing such plans. Employers seeking to
leverage their attractiveness to older employees in the future must likely
commit to such programs. 
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Boosting Current Workers’ Productivity
If it proves difWcult to entice more people into the labor market, perhaps
more production can be generated by current workers. In other words, it
may be possible to get by with slower labor force growth if employers can
Wnd a way to utilize existing human capital more efWciently. The goal of
achieving higher productivity as a society will ultimately have to be deliv-
ered at the employer level. 
Borrowing from Stewart (1997), we propose that an organization’s abil-
ity to create economic value is the direct result of how effectively it uses its
Wnancial, customer, and human capital resources. Financial capital includes
all of the Wxed and current operating assets of the organization. In commer-
cial and nonproWt enterprises, customer capital is the value that accrues to
an organization because of the client goodwill that makes them repeat cus-
tomers. In public sector endeavors, customer capital is embodied in the
political support that makes some jurisdictions preferred places for com-
mercial enterprises and families to locate. Total organizational effective-
ness is achieved through the linkage of the various forms of capital through
what Stewart calls “structural capital.” Structural capital is the set of pro-
grams, processes, and practices that allow an organization to leverage its
human capital in a way that it can maximize its effectiveness. In part,
employers accomplish this by the effective utilization of Wnancial and cus-
tomer capital assets, in combination with human capital. But structural
capital can also work as an accelerator on human capital resources to
accentuate an organization’s ability to create value. The task employers
face is Wguring out how to develop and use this structural capital to fully
exploit the human capital and sustain its productive use. By identifying why
some employers are more effective at stimulating highly productive work
environments than others, it is possible to teach those with low productiv-
ity levels how to improve, resulting in higher productivity growth.
Linking human resource management practices to organizational effec-
tiveness is an elaboration of economics production function:
P = Ka L1–a ,
where P represents product or output, K represents capital inputs, L equals
labor inputs, and a and 1− a represent the marginal product of K and L
respectively. This model suggests that enhancing human capital results in
the Wrm being generally more productive. 
Economists have found that there is a structural relationship between
worker productivity, pay, and age. Pay levels tend to be positively sloped
during the initial phases of working careers, peak somewhere around mid-
career or later, and then decline beyond a certain age. Improvements in
pay and productivity early in the career are related to on-the-job training
(Mincer 1974; Maranto and Rodgers 1984; Brown 1989). The leveling-out
Total Reward Programs for Tight Labor Markets 169
08chap7.qxd  1/8/03  10:38 AM  Page 169
of the age/earnings proWle beyond a certain age is seen as related to the
slowdown in the accumulation of skills, and ultimately to the depreciation
of knowledge acquired early in a worker’s career. In some cases, individual
workers themselves lose the appetite to continue to acquire new skills.
Employers may also lose interest in investing in workers at some point,
because the expected remaining period over which the investment in that
training can be amortized becomes so short that the returns on the invest-
ment become negative. As a consequence, older workers may end up with
more Wxed acquired skills as compared to younger counterparts, whose
capabilities are continuing to be enhanced because of personal and em-
ployer investment in them. Without continuous renewal of the skills being
brought to the labor market, individual worker’s human capital depreciates
just like the physical capital. 
When asked what effect increasing age had on worker productivity, 74
percent of the senior executives surveyed by Watson Wyatt indicated that
productivity decreases with age at some point (23 percent concluded that
age was unrelated to productivity, and 3 percent indicated that productivity
increased with age indeWnitely). Executives asked to indicate the approxi-
mate age at which productivity begins to decline indicated around age 55
(Watson Wyatt 2000). A similar Wnding was reported by Carliner (1982),
who found that earnings of men in their 50s and 60s declined relative to
those of younger men. 
The potential problem employers face in keeping on older workers is
sketched out in Figure 8. Some companies maintain traditional hierarchi-
cal structures that depend on relatively inexperienced workers at the bottom
having relatively little human capital, and then fewer workers Wll the suc-
cessively narrower ranks as competency and human capital levels rise. The
traditional job structure is characterized by the solid triangle in Figure 8.
But as baby boomers move into their most productive years, the workforce
may look more like the inverted triangle in Figure 8, characterized by an
abundance of highly experienced and skilled individuals. Unless employers
restructure to take advantage of boomers’ experiences and skills, workers
with high-level capabilities will end up doing lower-level jobs below their
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Figure 8. Hypothetical job structures and the evolution of the workforce in the
United States, 2000–2010. Source: developed by the authors.
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capabilities. Some of these will become frustrated and leave the labor mar-
ket prematurely, reducing rather than enhancing productivity, contrary to
what we argue the economy needs. 
An alternative way to consider these challenges relies on the perspective
of sociological or behavioral/psychological models. Here human resource
management is viewed in relation to measures of internal and external envi-
ronmental factors such as technology, organizational structure, stage of life
cycle, business strategies, organizational structures, and the like. Rather
than focusing as economists do on the marginal contribution that human
capital makes to organizations, these other approaches stress how “struc-
tural capital” can leverage human capital for value creation purposes.
Stewart (1997) points to the different evolutionary paths of Wal-Mart and
Sears as an example of two companies operating in virtually identical mar-
kets with very different results. The personnel these two companies brought
to their respective marketplaces were initially similar. Sam Walton may have
had a domineering character and a formula for retail marketing success,
but Sears could have found strong and bright managers and could have
copied Walton’s ways. Yet Wal-Mart succeeded relative to Sears and its other
competitors. In other industries this has also happened: Canon moved from
ground zero in the ofWce copier market, where Xerox held a near monop-
oly position, to a position of equality and then dominance (Hamel and
Prahalad 1994). Collins and Porras (1994) look at a series of paired com-
panies that operated for long periods to study why some companies are
more successful than others. 
Based on this and similar research, Jackson and Schuler (1995) have
developed a research taxonomy sorting organized human resource man-
agement practices into Wve areas. These are used to assess their impact on
achieving fundamental business goals, and they include (1) planning, (2)
stafWng, (3) appraising, (4) compensating, and (5) training and develop-
ment. Each of these has to do with the acquisition, development, or reward
of human capital within an organization. A body of research analyzes the
effectiveness of the various elements of this model; for example, Hansen
and Werenfelt (1989) test both economic and organizational models, and
then integrate elements of the two. An interpretation of their Wndings is
that not only does the quality of the human capital in an organization
matter, but also how that human capital is organized and marshaled for the
task at hand.
The human capital drivers that appear to have a marked effect on Wrm per-
formance include (Luss and Kay 1999): recruiting excellence, collegial and
Xexible work environments, communications integrity, and clear rewards and
accountability. That research also concluded that several human resource
policies are associated with value creation within the organizations studied.
As illustrated in Figure 9, the link between effective human capital man-
agement and higher shareholder returns works via employee and customer
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Figure 9. Human capital management creates shareholder returns. Source: Luss and
Kay (1999).
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satisfaction. Firms cannot manage their shareholder returns directly. Instead,
managers choose their product, service, Wnancing, and human capital strate-
gies to try to achieve superior Wrm performance. In the human capital area,
there are speciWc Wrm actions and behaviors that can cause measurably
higher levels of employee satisfaction and productivity with lower levels
of employee turnover. In turn, these improvements will result in higher cus-
tomer loyalty and satisfaction leading to the creation of surplus value within
organizations. 
Effective human capital management is a combination of four human
resource functions. Recruiting excellence allows a Wrm to acquire employ-
ees who either already possess the general human capital necessary to do
the jobs required, or who can be trained. The next step is to establish a
collegial and Xexible workplace so employees are encouraged to work well
together. Within this workplace, the Wrm must promote communications
integrity. This involves trusting employees enough to share information with
them and to allow them to communicate outside of hierarchical bound-
aries. Effective communication is crucial for leveraging human capital into
outstanding customer service. Finally, there needs to be an effective per-
formance management system with clear rewards and accountability to
establish the relationship between performance and rewards.
Luss and Kay (1999) derive weights for these four human capital drivers
by studying the relative effect of that variable on Wrm performance. The
authors found that a twenty-Wve-point increase in their index score was
associated with a 15 percent increase in Tobin’s Q, equivalent to an 18 per-
cent increase in market value for the median Wrm studied. Another inter-
esting result was that the Wrms that scored highly at one time continued to
be relatively high performers two and three years later. This research sup-
ports the claim that companies can use human capital management to have
a measurable effect on Wrm value. Human capital management can be used
to increase employee satisfaction, leading to higher customer loyalty and to
better Wrm performance. 
Conclusions
As the United States braces for an era of much slower growth in labor sup-
ply than experienced in the past, employers must begin to reconsider their
workforce practices if they wish to sustain their viability into the future. We
suggest that this will require programs to attract and retain the best and
the brightest. For these programs to be successful, employers must do more
to proactively recognize the needs of their workforces. If employers wish
to attract more women into the workplace, they must address issues that
have kept substantial numbers of them from participating. This means
implementing more suitable work-life solutions for women, such as on-site
childcare and more Xexible work schedules. If employers wish to delay the
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retirement of their most valued employees, they must rethink their retire-
ment policies and provide access to phased retirement. 
Although employers may be successful at bidding new workers into the
workplace and/or retaining their current staff, we still worry that employ-
ers may not be able to hire enough workers to meet production needs. To
survive, they will have to restructure and recreate a more conducive work
environment, one that can entice more production out of existing employ-
ees. It is the Wrms that are the most successful at managing their human
capital through effective communication programs, offering a collegial
work atmosphere, and establishing a performance management system with
clear rewards and accountability, that will be most effective. Ultimately,
these same Wrms will likely be the most successful at enhancing shareholder
value and who will survive to be the leaders of tomorrow. 
Notes
Opinions and conclusions drawn in this chapter are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent those of Watson Wyatt Worldwide or any of its associates. The
authors thank Tim Galpin, Ira Kay, Richard Luss, and Janemarie Mulvey for helpful
comments.
1. GDP is not a perfect measure of improved standards of living across this
period, in part because of the changing labor force behavior of women. In 1946,
fewer than half of working-age women in the United States were employed outside
the home, whereas nearly 80 percent were during 2000. As women have increasingly
entered the workforce, many tasks that were previously done by housewives and not
measured in the government’s calculation of GDP have been commercialized and
are now included in measures of national output.
2. Over the last three decades the annualized growth in GDP per capita was fairly
stable at 2.12, 2.25 and 2.33 percent for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, respectively.
3. The CBO projections are slightly more conservative than the Clinton adminis-
tration’s or the Blue Chip estimates. This is because projected economic growth
rates developed by the CBO and other prognosticators are solutions to a set of
simultaneous equations tracking activity across various economic sectors. CBO pro-
jections do not model cyclical variations in the demand for goods and services;
beyond the immediate short term. Underlying assumptions about capital growth
and technology drive projected labor productivity; as long as projected output is
consistent with prior patterns of production, most macro models assume markets
for goods and services will clear. It seems reasonable to assume that consumers can
keep up with increased productive capacity in the future.
4. The nonaccelerating inXation rate of unemployment is more generally re-
ferred to as the natural rate of unemployment. This is the rate of unemployment
that is implied by the present structure of the economy that accounts for the struc-
tural and frictional forces in the economy that cannot be reduced by raising GDP. 
5. We have not developed our own macroeconomic projection model; there are a
number of them around that are widely used in government and business planning.
We have no reason to believe that the macroeconomic projections from a model we
might build would generate signiWcantly different results than others given certain
underlying assumptions that are important in these types of projections.
6. By applying constant labor force participation rates in 2000 to population
shares over the coming decade, our baseline labor force is projected to be 156.7
174 Eric P. Lofgren, Steven A. Nyce, and Sylvester J. Schieber
08chap7.qxd  1/8/03  10:38 AM  Page 174
million in 2010. The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the actuaries at the Social Secu-
rity Administration have made similar labor force projections. However, the BLS
has published projections only for the 16 and over civilian labor force through 2008.
The BLS projects the 2008 labor force to be 154.6 million, the Social Security
Administration projects 151.3 million, while our baseline labor force is projected to
be 153.8 million (SSA 2001a; Fullerton 1999).
7. An unpublished hours series from the Social Security Administration com-
bined with the most recent estimates of GDP suggests that from 1995 to 2000,
worker productivity increased by 2.27 percent. While some argue for a “new”
paradigm in productivity growth, not all agree (Gordon 1999). For planning pur-
poses, prudence suggests that it is necessary to recognize three decades of histori-
cal data. 
8. For all practical purposes, this assumption is the equivalent of assuming the
end of early retirement in the United States. In this case, the need for workers 65
years and older depends on whether excess demand for labor persists in the labor
market after the higher participation rates of people between 55 and 64 years old
have been factored into the analysis. For completeness, we estimate labor force par-
ticipation rates and hours per worker assuming all workers 55 and over are equally
likely to increase workforce participation. Under the most conservative assumption
of productivity growth, labor force participation rates and hours per worker will
increase over 48 percent from their 2000 levels. For men ages 55–64, labor force par-
ticipation rates would need to rise from 68 percent in 2000 to 100 percent by 2010,
while women in the same age grouping would need to increase from 51 percent to
over 76 percent. This seemed an improbable scenario.
9. One explanation for the persistence of the forty-hour week is the rising impor-
tance of team production in the work place. Often times, for teamwork to be effec-
tive, it requires that all members be together at once.
10. Graig and Paganelli (2000) deWne phased retirement as arrangements that
allow employees approaching normal retirement age to reduce their work hours or
job responsibilities or both for the purpose of gradually easing into full retirement.
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